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"Youwill observe the Rules of Battle, of
course? the ~rute Knight remarked, putting on his
helIoot too.
"I always do," said the Red Knight, and they
began banging awayat each other with such a fury
that Alice got behirrl a tree to be out of the \vay
of the blows.
"I wonder, what the Rules of Battle are;." she
said to herself, as she watched the fight, timidly
peeping out from her hiding place. "One rule seems
to be, that if one Knight hits the other, he
knocks him off his horse; and, if he misses, he
tl.mlblesoff hiroself--and another Rule seems to be
that they hold their clubs with their arms, as if
they were Punch and Judy--What a noise they make
whenthey ttnnble! Just like a whole set of
fire irons falling into the fender! And howquiet
the horses are! '!hey let them get on and off just
as if they were tables!"
"Another Rule of Battle, that Alice had not
noticed, seemed to be that they always fell on
their heads; and the battle ended with their both
falling off in this way, side by side. Whenthey
got up again, they shook hands, and then the Red
Knight mountedand galloped off.
"It was a glorious victo:ry, wasn't it?" said
the White Knight, as he cameup panting.
"I don't know,"Alice said doubtfully ... "
-----Lewis carroll's Throughthe LookingGlass
2Oneof the most; delightful aspects of the works of
lewis carroll is the humorousextent to which serious
intellectual issues are reflected in his characters. For
the scholar, it is precisely this quality which gives
carroll's works their value. By seeing key theoretical
issues turned on their ears, insight is gained not only into
the nature of the problem itself, but also into the nature
of humanreason. Urrlerstarrling is achieved through the
study of carroll's topsy-turvy tales, because the relations
between the problems and the unusual contexts in which they
are placed are observed by the reader. Perhaps it is for
this reason that G. K. Chesterton has said, "It is not
children whoought to read the works of carroll," but
rather,
"sages and grey-haired philosphers .... That we find
pleasure in certain language and elaborate stories, in
certain complicated and curious fonns of diction, which
have no intelligible meanirq whatsoever, is not the
subject for children to play with; it is a subject for
psychologists to go madover."
Gardner 1962: 16
As humans, the fact that we find the mistakes and
blunders of others to be humorousat times is indeed a
curious phenomena. 'Ibis is important as it emphasizes the
significance of rules in our society. (see Baker and Hacker
1984: 243) Among others, the works of carroll, with their
nonsense rhymes, consistently illogical characters and
incorrigible puns, show the fascination we have with
linguistic rules in particular. Being one of the few
persons wittgenstein mentions in his Philosophical
3Investigations (1953), perhaps it is to Carroll's linguistic
humor that Wittgenstein is referring whenhe asks: ''Whydo
we feel a granunatical joke to be deep?" He explains,
"'!he problems arising through a misinterpretation
of our fonns of Lanquaqehave the character of depth.
'!hey are deep disquietudes; their roots are as deep in
us as the fonns of our language and their significance
is as great as the importance of our language."
Wittgenstein 1953: #111
While it would be far beyond the scope of this
present paper to atteJrpt any sort of complete answer to this
question, perhaps some light can be shed on the
investigation by a close examination of modern conceptions
of language am its study. By answering these questions we
maycometo see just what it is we know whenwe say we know
a language. '!his is however, not an easy task. '!he
concerns of language are not only very deep but their far
reaching relevance intertwines us in a web of related
issues. The problems of language do not only affect the
linguist, studying language for its own sake, but they also
arise for the philosopher, the mathematician, the
psychologist, the anthropologist, and well, everyone. But
this is just to restate the problem. Howshould one
approach the study of language? And, an even more difficult
question, what is the correct approach? rrhese are questions
which contemporary scholars must face. In fact, in the past
several decades questions about language and concern over
linguistic study have been in increasing academic vogue.
'Thegrowth of the discipline itself has had an important
4effect on the academic community. '!he recent emergence of
the generative theories of grammar can perhaps best be seen
as an indication of this effect.
'!he generative movementbegan with the
publication of NoamCllomsky'sSyntactic structures (1957),
where he initially set forward this approach. His promotion
of this theory is most;often referred to as "revolutionary"
because of the impact it has had upon the way in which
language is conceptualized. In their introductory text to
generative Linqui.st.i.cs, ModemLinguistics, Neil Smith and
Deidre Wilson describe the Cllomskianrevolution in this way:
"One iImnediate ~t was that linc:Juistics began
to be of interest to phllosophers, psychologists, and
logicians; this was large~y because Cllamskywas
proposing to draw COnclUS10nsfrom the nature of the
language to the nature of the humanlanguage-user--
conclusions which directly contradicted asstnnptions
currently being made in phil?SOphy and psychology, and
which seemed to warrant conslderation by philosophers
and psychologists."
Smith and Wilson 1979: 9
'Ihrough the years O1omskyhas constantly revised and
refined his theory. Significant portions of several of his
more recent works, including Rules and Representation
(1980), and Knowledgeof Language (1986), deal with the
nature of language in tenus of our knowledge of its grarranar.
Grammarsand their roles in linguistic activity play an
important part in influencing linc:Juistic theory. later, we
shall explore some of Olomsky's views in detail.
As prevalent as generative theory is however, not all
scholars, even those within the discipline, have been
5sourrllY convinced by Cllorn.skyam his fellow generati vists.
RoyHarris contends that muchpresent day theorizing about
language is based on misconceptions about the nature of
language. His works '!he language Makers (1980), '!he
LanguageMyth (1981), am '!he LanguageMachine (1987b), are
attempts to dispel these beliefs. Specifically, the latter
work is his attack on the generative approach am its
mechanistic view of language. '!he differences between
Harris' view am that of Cllorn.skycan be explained by
recognizing an important fact. One's conception of the
nature of language significantly influences the way one
approaches its study. Harris takes up the challenge of
exposing the basic linguistic assumptions of the
generativists. By showing howthese assumptions are
misguided, he can explain away the problems of generative
theory and illustrate the misdirection of that approach.
'Ibis paper shall take a similar approach in its critique of
Chomsky,
'Iheoretical disputes within linguistics however, are
not the only areas in which the nature of language is a
controversial topic. Recently, the conception of language
put forth by another reVOlutionary figure, the philosopher
ludwig Wittgenstein, has been central to academic
discussion. Oxford philosophers GordonBaker and Peter
Hacker have published a proliferation of works based on
Wittgensteinian thinking. '!heir works include a two volume
exegesis of Wittgenstein's Investigations as well as a
6defense of their ideas on linguistic rules titled
Skepticism, Rules and language (1984b). '!his work can be
seen as a response to an essay by Saul Kripke, Wittgenstein:
OnRules and Private language (1982). Kripke gives an
altogether different interpretation of Wittgenstein's view
of linguistic rules, than do Baker- and Hacker. While it is
not the task of this paper to delve further into this
debate, what is ilnportant is that it again emphasizes the
amountof time and effort tcx:lay's academic thinkers are
spending dealing with linguistic concerns. Before we begin
to look at someof these concerns specifically though,
perhaps first someperspective should be gained on howa
scholars's approach to language study is influenced by the
prior assumptions he makesabout what language is and how it
should be studied. 'Ihese assumptions, in tum, influence
not only howthe study is carried out, but also what is
being studied as well.
Alice, the linguist
'fuming back to the introductory passage from Carroll's
looking Glass, perhaps an analogy could help to guide our
inquiry. 'Ibis passage illustrates the earlier point that the
way in which language is approached influences the resulting
theory. Onecan easily see that Alice is in the familiar
position of the linguist. From behind her tree she must
deduce the "Rules of Battle" which the Knights so obligingly
7follOVIduring their joust. Similarly, the linguist must
deduce, from behirrl his "tree," the rules of language which
speakers use when they "encounter" one another. Both are
trying to give an account; of the knowledge the speakers, or
in Alice's case, the Knights, use to carry on their
"battle". From the White Knight's initial rerrark, ''Will you
observe the Rules of Battle?" one can assume that he is
referring to an established set of guidelines for fighting
that is known by all Knights. A similar case may be seen in
language. '!he collective set of guidelines, or rules, which
one observes when speaking a language is called its qranmar,
Thus when the White Knight asks, ''Will you observe the Rules
of Battle?" it can be seen as parallel to someone striking
up a conversation with a foreigner by asking "Do you speak
English?"--or, paraphrased, ''Will you observe the
grarranatical rules of English so that we might have a
conversation (i.e.-lido battle")?" One major concern of the
linguist is to understand what we meanwhenwe say a speaker
knows a grarranar.
In more explicit tenns, Smith and Wilson have described
a granmar as, II
"conceived of as a set of rules which have two
main functions. 'Ihey separate grarranatical from
ungrammatical sentences, thus making explicit claims
about what is I in the language' and what is not. '!hey
also provide a description of each of the grarranatical
sentences, stating howea~ sho~d be pronounced and
what it means.... they combme wi.th each other to fonn a
system--a grarranar--whichgives an explicit and
exhaustive description of every sentence which goes to
make up a language."
Smith and Wilson 1979:14
8'Ibis definition of a grammar seems to be analogous to
the conclusions Alice could obtain from watching the Battle.
She could deduce the Rules of Battle, from the actions of
the Knights, by seeing what attacks are performed am the
resul ts that then <::CCUr. " ••• if one Knight hits the other,
he knocks him off his horse; if he misses, he tumbles off
himself ... " Presumably the "Rules of Battle" also would
state attacks which are not permissible, though it maybe
impossible for Alice to detennine these from watching such
honorable Knights. 'Ibese unfair attacks are not a part of
B:3.ttle in the sameway that ungranun,atical statements are not
a part of a language. However, should a Knight make an
unfair hit, prest.nnablY they could appeal to their code as a
standard by which they could judge the action and settle the
dispute. In language-use, we follow a similar pattern. To
correct someone's speech we tum to the grammar to tell us
just howa sentence "should be pronounced am what it
means." '!here are other parallels as well, but what this
analogy is intended to show is just one approach to
language. 'Ibis approach is one of an observer. 'Ibe rules
which Alice is trying to determine are unknown to her for
she has not been trained as a Knight. 'This is the same as a
the task of the linguist studying a language which he does
not speak. Given a set of utterances by a speaker of the
language, the job of the linguist is to infer the rules with
which those utterances are in accord. Merely by observing a
set of such. utterances, however, the linguist does not have
9direct access to those rules. In the end, what he takes to
be the relevant rules will depend on his own interpretation
of the evidence. Obviously he would interpret the data so
that it is in accord with his theory. However, the theory
has been based on certain presumptions about what a grarranar
must be like. And yet, at this point one might wonder: if
these presumptions really do apply to the data. Perhaps the
data ought to be examined first in order to provide the
fund.aIrentals of the theory.
The reader as linguist
'!he story of Alice am the Knights can however, be
seen from another perspective as well. Anyoneat all
familiar with the Alice stories will at once recognize the
chess theme. rrhroughouthis tales Carroll uses this theme
to create his nonsense settings. '!he area in which Alice is
travelling is aligned with brooks am hedges which criss-
cross to form the chessboard. '!he characters which she
meets are all parcx:liesof chess pieces, our two knights for
example. Alice even alludes to the chess theme by
describing the knight's mounts "as if they were tables." 'Ihe
parallels are quite strong. Fromthis perspective then, the
"Rules of Battle" can be seen as analogous to the rules of
chess, which in tum, are referred to as a parallel of the
rules of grammar. Whatwe have is the often used games
analogy.
In playing a game we often appeal to the rules whenwe
feel that someonehas madean unjust or an incorrect IOOVe.
Werefer to the rules when trying to instruct someone in how
to play the gameor just when explaining the finer points of
the game to a novice. '!he rules are the starrlard by which
we judge fair play. '!hey define the IOOVesthat are
appropriate, or allowed in the game, am which are illegal,
or not part of the game. Rules guide the waywe play the
game. In muchthe sameway, we use grammatical rules. We
refer to the rules of grammar when teaching the larguage or
in explaining whywe used a particular term. Also, as
already stated, the rules of grammar tell us which
statements are within the larguage (grammatical ones) am
which are not (ungranunatical ones). Somelarguages even have
a version called the "standard version" to which its
dialects are often related as variations. other parallels
can, and have been drawn between language and games.
'!he anal.oqy between the gameof chess and the
interplay of language-users is quite commonin linguistic
discussions. Its first prominent use was by F. de Saussure.
Saussure is often referred to as the Father of Modern
Linguistics because of the lasting influence of his work the
Cours de linguistigue generale. (1916) (Yet another
revolution!) This was the first attempt to establish
linguistics as a science. In his forthcoming book, Roy
Harris compares Saussure's use of the games ana.Ioqywith its
use by Wittgenstein. In Language: Saussure and Wittgenstein
10
(1988), Harris characterizes the significance of the analogy
by saying:
"'!he chess canparison WOUldbe extremely important
in the work of both Saussure am Wittgenstein even if
all it did was to illuminate what kind of identity a
linguistic unit has. But it does far more than that.
It simultaneously throws light on meaning, on the
nature of language am linguistic rules am on the
relationship between thought am language. In short it
represents a radical shift of perspective on language,
replacing the nomenclaturist view by one fran which the
language-user is seen as essentially as the player of a
qame, For Saussure this is a shift which at one stroke
clarifies the whole enterprise of linguistic
description am at last makes it POSsible to place the
science of linguistics on a sound theoretical basis.
For Wittgenstein, it is the philosopher's antidote to
that 'bewitchment of out intelligence by means of
language.' (P.I., 109) which it is the business of
philosophy to dispel."
Harris 1988: 47-48
Harris' description shows, without a doubt, the
numerousparallels that can be gleaned from the games
analogy. Certainly carroll did not intend to illustrate
all, or perhaps any, of these parallels, for it was not his
intention to put forth a linguistic theory. '!he analogy is
helpful nonetheless, for from the reader's perspective we
see yet another approach to language. By seeing the Knights
as representations in an analogy, the speaker of a language
is seen as a game-player. '!his is quite a separate approach
to linguistic theory than is the one described by comparison
to Alice' s position. Note that here again, the role that
grammarsplay in theory is detennined by asstmlptions about
their nature. Even from this brief prelimina:ry examination
one obvious difference is that one view is theorizing about
something known and the other about something'unknown.
11
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Other sum differences shall be drawn out in the body of
this paper. By analyzing the approames of Chomskyand
saussure to linguistic study, their basic assumptions about
the nature of language will be revealed. At the center of
this discussion will be questions concerning what language
is and what it is not, about our knowledge of grannnar, and
about what it means to say we have sum knowledge.
Concluding remarks will compare and contrast the answers
provided by the Cllomskianand Saussurian theorist.
Saussure 's Approach: Linguistics as a Science
Both Saussure and Chomskyhave been referred to as
revolutionaries in their field. In fact, at some time, both
of their theories have been described as having a
"Copernican" effect upon the discipline. (Chomskyby
Voegelin 1958--cited in Newmeyer1980: 19 and Saussure by
Harris 1983: ix) This is perhaps not a felicitous
comparison, for roth Saussure and Chomskywere striving to
provide linguistic study with a firm foundation as a
scientific discipline. In each case, this was intended to
assure the study of language the respect and serious
consideration which the sciences accrue in the academic
corrnnunity. As this is an important motivating influence on
the theories of roth Saussure and Chomsky,it calls for
further examination.
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Saussure begins the Cours with a brief survey of the
history of language study describing the work done prior to
his generation as unscientific. He notes that the Greeks
began the study with the advent of Grantllar, but he argues
that the problem with this approach to language, which has
been "continued mainly by the French," is that it is a
prescriptive discipline "based on logic."
"It offers no scientific or objective approach to
language as such. Grammar aims solely at providirg
rules which distinquish between correct and incorrect
fonns. It is a prescriptive diSCipline, far removed
from any concern with impartial observation, and its
outlook is inevitably a narrow one."
Saussure 1916: 1
It must be noted, however, that Saussure does not
reject the inclusion of granunar in linguistics. His aim is
to establish linguistics as a scientific discipline. It is
the non-scientific methodologyof traditional grammar to
which he is objecting .
Saussure goes on to eliminate from consideration as
appropriate approaches to linguistic study the areas of
philology and comparative granunar as well. 'Ihese
approaches, while perhaps more rigorous in their meticulous
analysis of written texts, are dismissed because of their
"neglect of the living language." He argues that these
approaches are too historically oriented and do not focus on
the soc.ia.l and cultural implications of language. It is
with the Neogrammariansthat Saussure feels "Linguistics
properly so called, ... emerged from the study of the
14
Romance am Gennanic languages. II (Saussure 1916: 4) He
writes,
"TIle achievement of the Neograrranarianswas to
place all the results of comparative philology in a
historical perspective, so that linguistic facts were
connected in their natural sequence. TIle
Neograrranariansno lorger looked upon a language as an
organism developirq of its own accord, but saw it as a
product of the collective mind of a linguistic
carranunity . At the same tiIoo, there erooI:ged a
realization of the errors am inadequacies of the
concepts associated with IXlilology am comparative
grarmnar. II
Saussure 1916: 5
Nevertheless, Saussure claims that the Neograrranariansleft
manyquestions unanswered. It is at this stage in the
development of linguistics that Saussure situates his
theory.
For Saussure, the goals of linguistics are three:
"(a) to describe all known languages am record their
history. '!his involves trac~ the history of language
families and, as far as possible, reconstructing the
parent languages of each family;
(b) to determine the forces operating pennanently am
universally in all languages, am to generate laws
which account for all particular linguistic phenomena
historically attested;
(c) to delimit and define linguistics itself."
Saussure 1916: 6
It is interestirq to note, as has Harris, in his critical
corrunentaryon the Cours called Reading Saussure (1987), that
this is a precise application of "a general paradigm from
the philosophy of science" popular at the time Saussure
wrote the Cours. 'Theparadigm, as Harris defines it, is:
"For any science S, it falls to that science to
describe the phenomenawithin its domain.... to explain
that same phenomenaas particular instances of the
general laws of S.... [and] third, the way S
15
acx:omplishesthese twin objecti ves defines S as a
science."
Harris 1987: 12
It then becomes the goal of the first part. of the Cours to
define these "phenomena,"to give the object of study for
linguistics. '!his, Saussure argues, is an important
characteristic of any science. '!he scientist must have a
clear idea what he is studying am what his goals are in
undertaking the study. In adopting these scientific
standards, Saussure must present linguistics as a discipline
independent from those which surroum it, with its own
autonomousobject of study. '!his mayappear difficult for ,
as Saussure acknowledges, the object of linguistic study is
not "given in advance."
"other sciences are provided with objects of study
given in advance, which are then examined from
different points of view. Nothing like that is the
case in linguistics .... '!he object is not given in
advance of the viewpoint: far from it. Rather, one
might say that it is the viewpoint adopted which
creates the object. Furthertoc>re,there is nothing to
tell us in advance whether.one of these ways of looking
at it is prior to or super-ior to any of the others."
Saussure 1916: 9
Saussure argues that the duality of linguistic
phenomenacomplicates this difficulty. Oral articulation
has its counterpart in auditory reception. Sounds are
paired with psychological entities (concepts). Language
itself is divided into social and individual aspects.
Furthermore, the physical, the physiological and the
psychological can all be approached from one of two
directions. Anyapproach to linguistic study which neglects
16
this fur'x:lam:mtalduality of language will, saussure Claims,
be misconceived fram the very start. Instead, saussure's
solution to this dilenuna is to assert that
"'!be linguist must take the study of linguistic
structure as his primary concern, am relate all other
manifestations of language to it."
saussure 1916: 9
The relating of all manifestations of language to linguistic
structure is accomplished through the saussurian analysis of
the speech circuit.
'!he Saussurean Speech Circuit
A
...... ._ -.- '_:-:-~'--:'- - - - -- B
Oours de linguistigue QLenerale,p. 11
Twoindividuals are necessary to makea complete speech
circuit. The circuit begins whenone individual associates
a concept, or "fact of consciousness," called the signifie,
with certain sound patterns, called the signifiant, to form
a linguistic sign. '!his is a mental process, but the
formation of the linguistic sign is followed by a
physiological one, the actual articulation of the sound
pattern. '!his, in tum, is followed by a physical process,
17
the transmission of the sound through the air, from the
speaker Is mouth to the hearer Isear. '!he secorrl irrli vidual
receives the SOUrrl am the cycle is reversed. '!he
physiological process begins again am ultimatel Y, the
mental process restores the linguistic sign in the mind of
the secorrl irrlividual. '!his though is only half of the
circuit. Prestnnably the secorrl irrli vidual will resporrl by
making another association and the circuit will reverse
itself until it is completed in the first individual.
Saussure analyzes this circuit and delegates each
aspect to its proper area of study. The physical aspect he
totally eliminates from consideration, leaving it to the
physicist. 'Ihe physiological belongs to the phonetician.
'Ihe psychological however, he breaks downfurther, for he
wants to characterize linguistic structure as an abstract
mental entity.
The canpli.mentary "two-sidedness" of language is
reflected in Saussure IS mode.l, He constantly compares what
language is with what it is not. '!he study of language
through other disciplines is contrasted with howit is
studied by the linguist. Ultimately, even the
terminological distinctions that Saussure utilizes in his
theory reflect the duality he sees in language. The
langue/parole distinction is at the core of Saussurian
linguistics. This distinction is reinforced by the
separation of the social am individual aspects of language,
the synchronic arrl diachronic views of linguistic study, and
even the elivision of the linguistic sign into signifie am
signifiant.
'!he Saussurean concept of Ie langage is language with
all of its aspects together as a whole. '!he componentparts
of langage are la parole, or speech, am la langue, or
linguistic structure, that which linguistics proposes to
study. IXlring the speech circuit each irrli vidual has access
to la larxme, which in tum structures their thought am
their interpretation of speech S01.lOOs. '!he expression of
those thoughts in language is however, an act of parole.
'Theact of association which ties the signifi~ to the
signifiant is also seen from two different perspectives. On
the one hand, Saussure distinguishes between an executive
aspect, the speaker's act of associating a concept to a
sound pattern, and a receptive aspect, the hearer's
associating a sound pattern to a concept. 'Ihe distinction
between the executive and receptive act is thus a
distinction that belongs within la parole. Notice though,
that roth these associations are carried on in parole
independently by each individual. According to Harris
(Harris 1987: 24), the point of the distinction is to lay
the ground for the establishment of la langue in society.
In la langue, concept and sound pattern are associated
independently of individual speaker/hearers and their acts
of parole. Saussure describes the situation in this way:
"'!he individual' s receptive and co-ordinating
faculties build up a stock of imprints which turn out
to be for all practical purposes the same as the next
person's. Howmust we envisage this social prcduct, so
18
that the language itself can be seen to be clearly
distant fram the rest? If we could collect the totality
of word patterns stored in all those irrli viduals we
should have the social born which constitutes th~ir
language. It is a fund acet..nnUlatedby the members of
the connnunity through the practice of speech, a
grammatical system existing potentially in every brain
or lOOre exactly in the brains of a group of '
individuals; for language is never complete in any
single individual, but exists only perfectly in the
collectivity ...
Saussure 1916: 13
Saussure characterizes la langue as something shared by
society, am in that sense it is social or collective,
al though it is only accessed through the irrli vidual. La
parole, on the other harrl, is a genuine social activity,
requiring two or more individuals for it to occur. Saussure
thus describes la langue as something collective in nature
am yet used by the individual, am he contrasts this to his
characterization of la parole as irrli vidual actions seen
collectively as a social phenomena. '!his is not only
confusing to the reader of the Cours, but mayhave even
confused Saussure himself.
Perhaps a clearer understanding of Saussure' s
distinction between la langue am la parole can be gained by
examining a closely related parallel. Saussure's
grammatical system of la langue takes its place at the
interface of thought and sound. It is a social product;
although individuals perform the mental associations of
thought and sound in each event of parole. '!his interface
is the subject of his discussion of the substance/form
distinction.
19
"In itself, thought is like a swirling cloud
where no shape is intrinsically detenninate .... 'Ih~
substance of sound is no rrore fixed or rigid than that
of thought .... It is a maleable material which can be
fashioned into separate parts in order to SUWly the
signals which thought has need of .... 'Ihe cbaracteristic
role of a language ... is to act as inte:rnaliary between
thought and sound, in such a way that the canbination
of both necessarily produces a mutual 1y canple.rtaltary
delimitation of margin, where sound and thought ~t.
'Ihe contact between them gives rise to a fonn, not a
substance. II
Saussure 1916: 155-157
'Ihis description appears in a diSCUSSionof lin;Juistic
values. Linguistic values arise fram these ''nrutually
comple.rtaltary delimitations of units" that constitute la
langue. In other words, la langue is the collectivity of
signs and their relational values.
A rrore vivid illustration will help to shed light on
this aspect of Saussure f s theory. Each point on one side of
the page corresporrls to an area on the other side. 'Ihe two
are inseparable. 'lhus any division or cut we might make on
one side is also madeon the other. 'Ihe two-sided piece of
paper we may conceive of as the interface of two substances.
'!his is analogous to the meeting of thought and sound in the
realm of language. Whena circle or other figure is cut out
of paper, the substance of the paper takes on the fonn of a
circle. '!his formal, structure is imposed on the substance.
At the intersection, roth sides of the paper are equally
affected by the form, Youcannot cut out a circle on one
side and a triangle on the other side of the same sheet of
paper. Similarly, the formal, structure imposed on sound by
language mirrors that imposed on thought. From Saussure Is
20
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point of view, linguistics should be the study of fonn, not
substance. '!he sounds are in the field of the phonetician.
He studies a different substance than the psychologist, who
studies thought. Both of them however, must tum to the
linguist to detennine the formal structure of what they
study. '!his is how linguistics gains its autonomy. Its
object of study is the formal structure referred to by
saussure as "langue."
Finally, in order to have a complete urrlerstarrling of
la langue am saussure Is theory, one must urrlerstarrl the
nature of linguistic sign. Ia langue, as saussure points
out, is not a simple nomenclature, relating names am
things. As noted earlier, the linguistic sign is an
association between a concept and a sound pattern. It is a
"two-sided psychological entity." '!he two sides, obviOUSly,
are the concept, which he refers to as the signifie, am the
sound pattern or signifiant. Whathe means by
"psychological entity" is that the linguistic sign is not a
thing. '!hat is, it is not a substance but rather a
componentof fonnal structure.
1:he linguistic sign has two major characteristics: that
of arbitrariness and that of linearity. '!he linearity of
the sign simply refers to the fact that the signifiant
exists in time. Because the signifiant has only one
dimension, only one signifie can be presented at one time.
They must relate in a linear succession, one after the
other. '!he linguistic sign is also arbitrary. For
Saussure, what this means is that there is no natural
connection between the particular pattern of sounds am the
irrlividual concept that is associated with it. 'Ibere is no
reason why [k] [a] [t] is associated with a furry, four
legged, meowinganimal rather than the pattern [b] [I] [I]
[k]. 'Ibe way the signs gain their neaning ani value is only
in their relations to each other. A particular fonn is what
it is because it is not another fonn. Sign-1 means what it
does because it is not sign-2 or sign-3. Sign-2 meanewhat
it does because it is not sign-1 or sign-3, and so forth.
since every assignment of signifiant to signifi~ is
arbitrary, there is no reason for preferring one sign over
another. As Saussure says, ''Values have no other rationale
than usage am general agreem:mt." (Saussure 1916: 112) 'Ibis
once again echoes the importance of the sociaj aspect of la
langue. In a given speech community, the collective set of
all signs in the minds of all the speakers is the only way
la langue exists "perfectly." 'Ibis description of la langue
is confusing for it seems to imply that each one of us has
only an ilrperfect knowledgeof linguistic stnlcture in our
minds. Perhaps with a more critical eye to Saussure's
description of la langue Saussure' s theory maycometo be
urrlerstood •
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saussure in Review
'!he brilliance of saussure' s lir~uj_stic theory lies in
his identification of la langue as the object of linJuistic
study. With his cbaracterization of la langue he gives the
discipline an object worthy of scientific study, secure in
its autonomyand yet relative to allied disciplines. He
acx:::anplishesthis through his analysis of the speech
circuit, but the system of dualities which he creates
cbaracterizes the facets of language in constant comparison
to each other. 'Ibis contrast fosters a tension in
understanding the theory. Manytimes saussure defines his
terms negatively, not explicitly stating, for example, that
"'!his is la langue ... ". but rather describing it in contrast
to what it is not. '!his leaves one worxieringwhether or not
la langue can starrl on its own. Like a clever illUSionist,
Saussure seems to direct attention away from someof his
basic assumptions Ieavirq them only vaguely explained.
In present.inq his contrasts within language (langage) ,
Saussure cbaracterizes la langue as something that the
irxiividual is powerless to change. 'Ibis is because la
langue is someth~ removedfrom the in:lividual and from the
individual will ("exist~ only perfectly in the
collectivity"). He writes:
"A language, as a collective phenomenon,takes
the form of a totality of imprints in everyone's brain,
rather like a dictionary of which each irx:lividual has
an identical copy. '!hus it is someth~ which is in
each individual, but is none the less cormnonto all.
At the same tiIoo it is out of reach of any deliberate
interference by individuals."
saussure 1917: 19
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Yet the irrlividual must have access to la langue if speech
is to be productive am cx:mm.micationis to take place.
On the other harrl, la parole has the characteristic of
being almost; purely irrli vidual, for no two speakers talk
alike. '!hen again, speech must also have some social
aspects for it to work: it is, in essence, a social
activity. '!he problem then is that the nature of the
connection between la langue am the irrlividual act of
parole appears to be a mystery. '!he use of la langue in an
act of parole is ~thing perrormsd by the imividual, not
by the collectivity. '!his is not unlike someoneusing a
dictionary. Wemayeach have our own dog-earred copied of
the OED,but like la langue, what is contained in the OED
"exists perfectly" only in same abstract social sense. We
are each free to alter the definition of a given word in our
own text; but this does not alter the OEDdefinition of that
word. Given Saussure Is description of the irrli vidual signs
of la langue as arbi tra:ry am his account of the relational
system of values, one worrlers hOW'such a system could ever
be used in the social act of cx:mm.micationbetween
irx:iivictuals. Urrler Saussure Is conception of the relational
values of the signs that compose la langue, if one speaker
knows one more or one less sign than another speaker, a
possible circumstance, then they will have different
relations amongtheir individual signs and therefore possess
two different copies of la langue. Hence, they will not be
able to understand one another because the signs used will
have different relational values for each speaker. Ani yet,
this is a paradox, for cammunicationdoes irrleed frequently
take place. However, if both speakers pC>SSessed identical
copies of la langue then they could canmunicate quite
effectively. However, if this were the case then a language
would exhibit no social or geographical variation. Not only
does the regular existence lin;)uistic variation challenge
the idea of identical copies of la langue, but it suggests a
methooological dilemmaas well. Even if la langue is a
collective entity, it mayonly be studied by observing the
behavior of individuals.
Harris notes that Labov raises this problem in
descriptive linguistics am calls it the "Saussurean
paradox." (Harris 1987: 198, Iabov 1972: 267) The problem
as Harris explains it is that:
"If la langue is stored inside every speaker's
head, the testimony of a single irrlividual in principle
suffices as data for the lin;)uist' s description of la
langue (even if - and perhaps ideal IY if - the witness
am the linguist are one am the sameperson). By
contrast, data for the description of parole can be
obtained only by observing speech events as am when
they occur in social interaction, because such events
are not already stored in the heads of the individuals,
even the participants themselves. '!his conclusion is
said to be paradoxical because it reverses the basic
Saussurean characterization of la langue as social, as
opposed to la parole as individual ([30]): for it turns
out that to study la langue it will suffice to study
the individual, whereas to study la parole will require
collecting evidence from the conmrunio/."
Harrls 1987: 198
Once again this problem can perhaps IOC>reeasily be seen
in tenns of the carrollian examplediscussed previously.
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WonderlarrlRevisited
Alice's position in relation to that of the Knights
would allow her to collect data for a description of parole.
By watching and recording the actions of the Knights she
will have a list of IOCWesand interactions appropriate for
doing Battle. However, in an interview with one of the
Knights she could also gather infonnation about the "Rules
of Battle." '!his sort of data could be evidence for her
description of la langue. One problem she might face is
that in her discussions with the two Knights she may obtain
two different descriptions of the "Rules of Battle." 'Ibis
is the same as a linguist obtaining two different
descriptions of English grammar from interviewing two
speakers of English. '!he paradox arises whenwe try to
explain the fact that though the Knights use different rules
and the speakers have different grammars, battle takes place
and understanding is achieved through conmrunication. How
can Alice even be sure that the Knights are following the
same set of Rules except by the very fact that they do
Battle? If each Knight has his own set of Rules, Alice
would not want to study either individual set, but rather
the set of Rules "shared" by them. That; is, she would
really want to understand the system (the set of rules) that
exists in the collectivity between them.
In order to understand Saussure's position it is
perhaps instructive to tum to the alternate interpretation
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of the carrollian passage which focuses on the language game
analogy. As previously mentioned, the language game analogy
does muchwork for Saussure. In language: Saussure and
wittgenstein, Harris points out that the chess analogy in
particular is effective for illustrating the "institutional
character of language, its regularity and its autonomy."
(Harris, forth caning 1988) Each of these aspects is
supported by similarities between the rules of chess and
granunatical rules. '!he analogy and the similarities also
support Saussure' s langue/parole distinction. '!he playing
of games is a social activity perfonned by irrlividuals, just
as is speech. Yet the rules of chess exist irrleperrlently of
any irrlividual, al though they are grourrled in the playing of
particular games, just as la langue is grourrled in a
community's parole. still, an irrlividual lOOVein a game is
the act of one person, not of a collectivity. It is the
application of a rule. Saussure wants to think of the
individual's access to la langue as similar to one's
knowledgeof the rules of a game. However,understanding
how one gains access to the rules still doesn't explain
their nature as a camnonlyshared system. Even though this
mysterious connection can be seen through analogy, the
question remains as to howla langue should be described.
Regardless of howone attempts to solve the problem,
Harris argues that the paradox does not even arise for
Saussure because his basic assunpt.ion is that la langue is
both "a social institution am an irrli vidual cogniti ve
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system." (Harris 1987: 198) Without this claim saussure
would never be able to satisfy the goals he had set for
himself with regard to establishirg linguistics as an
autonomousscience. 'Ib adopt rut one of those views is to
reduce linguistics to the realm of social anthropology or
psychol.oqy respectively. Without postulating an
autonomouslangue, linguistics fails to be a science at all
urrler Saussure Is conception. Arrl yet, without
distinguishing between the "irrli vidual initiative" am the
"collective usage" Saussure leaves himself open to
difficulties in detennining whether or not evidence belongs
to la parole or to la langue (Harris 1987: 235). He seems
to be balancing on the proverbial fence between a
theoretically postulated langue am a methodological
distinction of the data. As Harris concludes:
"Saussure is thus ensnared in a theoretical trap of his
own making. Proclaiming on the one hard that in
linguistics it is the viewpoint chosen which creates
the linguistic object, he fails on the other hard to
demonstrate that his recammerx:led viewpoint creates any
scientifically identifiable object at all."
Harris 1987: 235
Rlilosophical Concerns
'!his conclusion leads Harris to yet another criticism
of Saussure. Harris argues it is because of his scientific
approach to linguistics that Saussure adopts the speech
circuit as his model of communication. Harris observes
however, that Saussure has built his model "not based upon
contenporary fimings in psychology, Iilysiology arrl
P'lysics," of saussure's time, but rather he has oorrowed "a
psychological explanation of oral ccmnunication of the k.irrl
propounded in its classical fonn in the seventeenth century
by Jolm Locke." Harris writes:
"saussura simply takes over two basic claims of this
old psychological theory and incorporates them as
premises in his model , 'Ihese are: (L) that
canmrunication is a process of "telementation" (that is,
of the transference of thoughts from one humanmirrl to
another), and (ii) that a necessary am SUfficient
corrlition for successful telementation is that the
process of conmrunication, by whatever mechanismsit
errploys, should result in the hearer's thoughts bainq
identical with the speaker IS. "
Harris 1987: 205
One obvious problem that results from such a theory is
that saussure must explain haN it is that the in:lividuals in
the speech circuit will encode am decode exactly the sarre
thoughts. Clearly if everyone shared identical copies of la
langue then this would be guaranteed, provided the
physiological am physical aspects of the circuit functioned
correctly. '!he exact one-to-one corresporrlence of the
signifie to signifiant in the minds of each irrli vidual WOUld
result in precisely the same associations being made in the
hearer's mind as in the speaker's. HaNever, as the evidence
of social am geographical variation shows, it is not the
case that all members of the same linguistic connnunityshare
identical copies of la langue.
An interesting twist to this problem can be illustratoo
by asking whether or not one could "talk to oneself".
Harris argues that urrler a Saussurean account this is not
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possible. He says that there nrust be a difference between
"B's hearirg what A says" am "Ahearirg what A says."
otherwise, Awould not know what he was saying until after
he had said it. As Harris emphasizes, two intividuals are
needed for a complete speech circuit. (Harris 1987: 209)
Saussure ' s position here is SllpIX>rted by his discussion
of the substancejfonn distinction. He uses the surface of
the ocean as analagous to the interface between thought am
sourrl. Both the substances of water am air are "amorphous
masses. " '!bought is "chaotic by nature" am it is only by a
"somewhatmysterious process by which 'thought-sou.rrl'
evolves divisions" am "is madeprecise by this process of
segmentation." He also writes:
"Philosophers and linguists have always agreed
that were it not for signs, we should be incapable of
differentiating any two ideas in a clear am constant
way. In itself thought is like a swirlirg cloud, where
no shape is intrinsically determinate. No ideas are
established in advance, arrl nothing is distinct, before
the introduction of linguistic structure."
Saussure 1916: 155-157
It would seem then that urrler Saussure' s conception,
rationality is only present once one has learned a language.
Even if one is only thinking to oneself, thought would be
inconprehensible unless ordered by linguistic fonn.
However, even though Saussure adopts this attitude
towards the relation of thought to language, his conception
of la langue presents other philosophical difficulties in
this area. '!he skeptic could argue that one could not be
assured one was even using the sane system each tine one
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accessed one's own langue. Howcan one be sure that the
signifie that is associated to a particular signifiant is
the sarre signifi~ that was associated to it the last tboo it
was expressed. A speaker only krlcMs what a sign means by
his irrli vidual access to la langue. Whatassures him that
this access is also the sarre? Saussure correctly denies that
his theory is a nomenclature, but the very same argument
applies here as well. Even if Ireaning is conceived of as a
correspondence between merrtat entities (signifiant am
signifie), then the problem of the constant identity of such
correspondences still arises. '!his argument shall be
explored further in relation to O1omsky's theory.
Considering tbat the assigIlllV:mtof signifi~ to
signifiant is entirely arbitrary, Saussure cannot guarantee
that each assignment shall be the same not only from
individual to individual, but for each assigIlllV:mtby a
particular individual. Yet, from another perspective it
might be argued tbat this problem never actually arises for
Saussure because for him the system of la langue is given in
advance for every member of the camnunity, handed downby
the previous generation. As Taylor argues:
" ... the link between signifiant and signifie is not
guaranteed by our commonbiological origins but rather
by society's imposition of arbitrary linguistic
structure on the mind of the individual. From
Saussure's perspective, there is no wo~ ~~ two
individuals might not attach the same slgnlfle to the
same signifiant. For linguistic structure itself
detennines both the set of signifies which the
language-user has available for communicationas well
as their cormections to particular signifiants."
Taylor, forthcoming, p. 13
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Although Saussure never recognizes these difficulties
for his theory, it would seem that his POStulation of a
mental entity such as la langue creates unnecessary
confusions am problems. He seems to be correct in his
analysis of speech as a social activity, but perhaps
needlessly looks' within the mind for the resolution of how
it is that we know and use language in parole for the
purposes of carranunication. Even though Saussure Is
conceptualization of language never took a strong hold in
the linguistic conmn.mity,his structural methodology would
remain influential for generations. In discussion of
CllomskyIs theory we will see many Saussurean reflections.
Perhaps unforttmately, not only are there theoretical
parallels, but analogous criticisms as well.
Rejection and Revolution
Amongother reasons, the rise of behaviorist PSYchology
in the 1930IS, with its rejection of mentalist explanations
of humanbehavior, severly hindered the adoption of
Saussure Is linguistic theory by academia. Instead, a
similar approach, by AmericanStructuralist Leonard
Bl<XJmfield,began to take hold in the intellectual
community. Whereas for Saussure "the mental association of
the signifiant with signifie is a postulate of linguistics,"
and not in need of any further explanation, Bloomfield
appears to go one step further and "provide a mechanistic
explanation in behavioristic terms of the relationship
between la parole and the signs of la langue." (Harris 1981:
98-99)
Holding an empiricist view of science, Blcx::.mfieldian
strucl-uralists approached language hoping to '" discover' the
granunar by perfonning a set of operations on a corpus of
data. Each successive operation was one step further
removed from the corpus." Ultimatel y, this methodology
produced a granunar based on several "levels of description."
(Newmeyer1980: 6)
However, as behaviorist psychology grew less and less
severe in its attitude toward "cogniti ve behavior," the
interdisciplinary area of psycholinguistics evolved.
(Newmeyer1980: 11) 'Ihe rise of this new view of language
study, as well as emergin;J philosophical concerns with
empiricism and the "unresolved problems of structural
linguistics" left the discipline ripe for revolution.
(Newmeyer1980: 15)
Having examined saussure's attempt at modeling
linguistics on the sciences, this section of the thesis
shall discuss the specifics of Chomsky's scientific
approach. 'Ihen, some similarities in the two theories will
be brought out. 'Ihese similari ties include the parallel
between Saussure' s langue/parole distinction with Chomsky's
notions of competence and perfonnance . Finally, before
beginning a critical examination of Chomsky,their shared
mentalist assumptions shall also be discussed.
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Chomsky's Scientific Approach
Chomsky's two major works Syntactic structures (1957)
and Aspects of the '!heory of Syntax (1965), as well as many
subsequent works, present an intriguing view of the study of
language as a scientific endeavor. In a nnre recent work,
he gives the following reasoning for urrlertaking such a
study.
[B]y studying language we maydiscover abstract
principles that govern its structure and use,
principles tha~ are. unive:rsc:tlby biological necessity
and not mere hfstorf.caf, accadent, that derive from
mental characteristics of the species. A human
language is a system of remarkable complexity. 'Ib come
to know a humanlanguage would be an extraOrdinary
intellectual achievement for a creature not
specifically designed to accomplish this."
Chomsky1975: 4
Irrleed, as Chomskysays, a language is something
remarkably complex. And, equally as true, it would be a
major accomplishment for someone, or something, to be said
to have learned language without same sort of natural
predisposition for this task. Appropriately then, one WOUld
want to say that humanshave such an ability. Part of the
motivation for Chomsky's linguistic rationalism stems fram a
long-starrling philosophical tradi tion which points to this
ability as the characteristic separating man from the
animals (Harris 1987b: 9, Smith and Wilson 1979: 33, Chomsky
1975: 40). Chomskyhimself points out that his
interpretation of humanlinguistic ability as based upon
"psychologically apriori principles" is strikingly similar
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to the doctrine of irmate ideas upon which JOOStrationalism
is based. (D'Agostino 1986: 61) It would seem then that a
complete scientific characterization of this ability would
bring about great insight into the nature of our own being
as humans. '!his is the task which Olomskysets for himself.
In the second chapter of his book Lirguistic Theory In
America (1980), Newmeyer discusses Olomsky's "scientific
perspective" which he sees as Olomsky's "gift to the field."
(Newmeyer 1980: 20) He writes:
"Olomskyattacked the structuralist-empiricist
concept of a linguistic theory for imposing corrlitions
on theory formation which were incompatable with the
provision of an insightful picture of the workings of
humanLanquaqe, Cl10mskyargued that in fact NOscience
demands that a theory be literally extractable from the
primary data .... In his view, the JOOStlinguistic theory
can realistically hope to construct is an E'VAIlJATION
proc:edure for granunars--a machanical way of deciding
between alternative grammars within a particular
theory. Arrl, as Cl10mskypointed out, even an
evaluation procedure is more than lOOStsciences would
hope to accomplish: ''!here are few area of science in
which one would seriously consider the possibility of
developing a general, practi~l, mechanical, method of
choosing amongseveral theo:les, each compatible with
the available data (Syntactlc Structures, p. 53) '"
Newmeyer1980: 21
Like Saussure, Chomskymodels his linguistic theory on
theories of natural science. Chomskythough often also
likens the task of the linguist to that of a child learning
Lanquaqe, As the child observes the world around him, he
collects a set of linguistic data, from the utterances of
his parents and siblings, for example. '!his is parallel to
a scientist collecting observations of a phenomena. The
child must then detennine howthe utterances he has heard
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are created. Likewise, the scientist hypothesizes the
reasons for the occurrance of the particular event he has
observed. 'Ihese causes then fonn the basis for his theory
explaining the phenomena. Similarly, the child's reasoning
becomes a part of his granunar. For the Cllomskianlinguist,
however, the problem is to explain how a finite set of data ,
which represents an infinite possible set, can be used to
determine the finite set of rules which WOUldgenerate them.
Froma philosophical point of view this raises the skeptical
problem of induction. By adopting this method of reasoning,
not only nrust Cllamskyexplain which sentences WOUldresult
from the finite set of rules, but also why only those
sentences are created am not others. Cllomsky,however,
does not see this as an objection, but merely an obstacle to
overcome. Given his assumption that the mind has a
cognitive structure of language built in biologically, then
it nrust have some sort of "pre-progrannning." (Baker and
Hacker 1984: 287) '!hus, an explicit description of this
prc:xJrCUlUllingwould yield a successful characterization of the
structure itself. A fuller description of what Cllomsky
means by granunar is necessary before examining his reasoning
for these assumptions.
In contrast to Saussure' s notion of la langue,
Chomsky's notion of linguistic competence involves a very
different conception of grannnar. In one sense, Cllomsky
defines grannnar as "a theo:ry of the psychological structures
arrl processes which provide the basis of manifestation of
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competence." (D'Agostino 1986: 66) Yet, in another sense ,
one's granunar is the mental structure which provides one
with linguistic ability. Cllamskywrites:
"Its [generative grammar] st:.ampoint is that of
individual psychology. It is COncerned with those
aspects of form and meaning that are determined by the
"language facul ty ," which is urrlerstocx:i to be a
particular component of the humanmind, '!he nature of
this faculty is the subject matter of a general theory
of linguistic structure that aims to discover the
framework of principles and elements COll1IOC>nto
attainable humanlanguages; this theory is now often
called "universal grammar" (UG), adapting a traditional
tenn to a new context of inquiry. UGmaybe regarded
as a characterization of the genetically determined
language facility. One may think of this faculty as a
"language acquistion device," an innate component of
the humanmind that yields a particular language
through interaction. with ~resented experience, a device
that converts exper.ience mto a system of knowledge
attained: knowledge of one or another language."
Cllomsky1986: 3
'Ihese two very different senses of grammar can be
confusing. On one level O1om.skycan speak of the grammar in
one's head and be referring to the mental structure, the
language acquistion device. On another level, he can speak
of grarranatical rules, or the "abstract principles" he
mentions, but be referring to part of the theory of UG,
rather than something actually in the brain. '!his ambiguous
meaning for "grarranar" is the source of manytheoretical
questions as it leads to the reevaluation of manyother
related tenus.
Cllomsky's technical tenn "competence" can be defined
very broadly as "knowledge of language." (Smith and Wilson
1979: 271) Whenone is said to have competence in a
language, one has Jmowledgeof the grammar of that language.
38
More specifically though competence can be defiflej as the
"ability to impose perceptual structure on linguistically
unstructured acoustic sensations." (D'Agostino 1986: 65)
Parallel to saussure, Cllomskycontrasts competence, that
which a speaker knows, to perfonnance, that which the
speaker does, just like the langue/parole distinction.
Notice however, that while the executive am receptive
association of signifiant to signife was an individual act
of parole for Saussure, the same association as Chomskysees
it, is solely an aspect of competence, not of perfonnance.
'!he implications of this solve the methodological problems
inherent in Saussure' s theory, although fran Saussure' s
position, Chomskyis failing to realize the distinction
between substance and form. For Chomsky,it is
psychological substance which is prior; for linguistic
competence is said to iJnpose perceptual structure on
previousl y unstructured sourrl. For Saussure however, the
psychological substance and the physical substance are both
structureless before they come into contact with each other.
'Theyonly achieve fonn through contact. 'Iheir meeting is
arbitrary, neither imposing fonn on the other but gaining it
simultaneously. Given his attribution of structural
priority to psychological substance, one can see whyChomsky
views linguistics as an aspect of psychology rather than an
autonomousdiscipline.
'Ihe Saussurean paradox and the difficulties resulting
from Saussure r s social/psychological fence-balancing are
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thus only "solved" only by Cllomsky's jumping down
unambiguously on one side of the fence: the psychological.
'Ibis lI¥JVeresults in the allowance of the intuitions of
irrlividual speakers as primary linguistic facts. Whereas
for Saussure there was a problem determining if such facts
belonged to la langue or pcrrole, this is not a problem for
Cllamskybecause he views structure as a result of the
psychological. 'Ibe intuitions of speakers are viewed as
directly reflective of their linguistic competence.
Fundamental Assumptions of Generati vism
In his text Cllomsky's System of Ideas (1986),
D'Agostino argues that Cllomskypresents a coherent package
of several philosophical assumptions. (D'Agostino 1986: 62)
It is these assumptions am their consequences for
methodology that distinquish Cllomskyfram Saussure. In
keeping within the "unity of the system of his ideas,"
D'Agostino argues that in adopting a intuitionist view,
several other philosophical assurnptions madeby O1omskyare
mademanifest. (D'Agostino 1986: 63) D'Agostino defines a
belief in subjectivism as the opinion that "language-users
give linguistic entities the properties which they have, and
according to which the scientific identification and
explanation of ... [them]... is psychological. (D'Agostino
1986: 4) Indeed, as evidenced from the discussion on the
association of concept to sound, Cllomskyand Saussure do not
agree on this issue.
Saussure would view Cllomskyas profourx:Uy
misinterpreting the nature of linguistic structure. To
recall the substance/fonn analogy, Saussure would accusa
Cllomskyof misattributing the forms which are iJnposej on the
interface of thought am sound to someaspect of thought.
Instead, it was the point of Saussure's distinction to show
that linguistics, the study of forms, is irrleperrlent of roth
psychology, the study of merrta.l content, and phonetics, the
study the other substance, that of sound.
'!he secorrl assumption that D'Agostino argues Chomsky
makes concerns the related issue of irrlividualism.
Individualism is the view that "all social phenomena, such
as language, are to be explained, ultimately , in terms of
the individual." (D'Agostino 1986: 11) Again recalling the
confusion of Saussure's description of la langue, it would
at first seem difficult to detennine Saussure's position on
individualism. However, if la langue exists only perfectly
in the collectivity, it would appear Saussure is arguing
against individualism. Repeatedly he says that language is
social and that the individual is powerless to change it.
He also points out that though it is arbitrary, language is
inherited fram the previous generation. Because of this the
social institution of la langue am its characteristics are
logically prior to those of the individuals and their minds.
(D'Agostino 1986: 01. 1, Sec. 7) As we have seen, this
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leaves Saussure in a COIt'prornisingposition fram which he
refuses to budge. Cllomsky however, takes a stand and, as
stated, the results of this are methcx:lological. In order to
study linguistic competence, it suffices to study the
individual speakerjhearer.
In contrast to the Bloomfieldian structuralists ,
Cllomsky relies on the intuitions of native speakers.
Intuitionism is another fundamental assumption of the
generativists. Newmeyercharacterizes the intuitionist
Ioodel that Cllomsky adopts as:
"an axiomated system generating an infinite set of
sentences with their associated structural description
am is to be judged for empirical adequacy by its '
ability to handle the primary linguistic data-the
judgements native speakers can make ••• about certain
aspects of their language."
Newmeyer1980:21
Cllomsky himself even describes intuitions as the "ul, timate
standard that detennines the accuracy of any proposed
grammar, [or] ... linguistic theory." (Chomsky 1965: 21) 'Ihis
seems to be a reasonable step, for whoelse but the native
speakers of a language would have utmost authority on that
language given his assumptions of subjectivism and
individualism? This model also seems plausible in that it
makes sense of the assunpt Ion that grammar, for Chomsky, is
something internalized. It is this internal knowledge, this
grammar or system of rules, knownby all speakers of a
language, that the Chornskianlinguist hopes to describe. It
stands to reason that sentences predicted as grammatical by
such a linguistic description would have to be subjected to
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a speaker's intuitive analysis for verification. This is
related to what Chomskymeans by his notions of
grarnmaticality and acceptibility.
acceptability is an issue of perfonnance. It refers to
those sentences that are most likely to be uttered. (Chomsky
1965: 11) Perhaps one way of describing what Chomskymeans
by an acceptable sentence is to say that they are those
sentences whidl appeal to a speaker intuitively as one whidl
they themselves might conceivably produce or hear. In
addi tion to performati ve limi tat ions , one of the main
criteria for a sentence to be acceptable is that it also be
grammatical. It is criteria for grarnmaticality whidl are
part of one's linguistic competence. They are internal
considerations and therefore intuitive, as well. As
mentioned, this is one of the characteristics of the rules
of a grammar, that they define whidl sentences are part of
the language. For Chomsky,what this means is that only a
grammar which produces all am only those sentences that are
acceptable to speakers could be a poss ibj.a grammar of that·
language.
Presumably, the ultimate goal for Cllomskywould be to
give an account; of the set of "abstract pr.inciples" that
govern the structure , acquisition, and use of languages.
ChomskyIs scientific way of thinking leads him to adopt a
mentalist view of linguistic ability. Analogizing from the
spectnnn of animal to man, he compares the mental to the
physical in the same vein. He says:
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":&Ithumancogniti ve systems, when seriOUSly
investigated, prove to be no less marvelous and
intricate than the phys.ical. structures that develop in
the life of the organism. Whythen, should we not
study the acquistition of a cognitive structure such as
language IIX:>reor less as we study ~ conplex bodily
organ? .... The idea of regarc:lirg the growth of language
as analogous to the develO{m:mtof a bodily organ is
thus quite natural and plausible."
Chomsky1975: 10-11
This is one plausible explanation for man's superior
linguistic ability over the animals. Such an explanation
also helps to explain howthese "abstract principles" could
be universal. A biological explanation does not however,
necessaril y rule out other explanations , divine en:iowment,
for example. In any event, simply to say that linguistic
ability is something natural is not to explain its character
fully. One still wonders what the specific characteristics
of these "abstract principles" might be.
Final Iy, there is one other characteristic of Cllomsky's
theory that should be brought out for a complete
understanding of it. Not only does Cllomskydescribe
corrpetence, a speaker's linguistic knowledge, as something
innate, he also describes it as a state of the mind. In
Knowledgeof Language (1986) he writes,
''Weshould, so it appears, think of knowledge of
language as a certain state of mindjbrain, a relatively
stable element in transitory mental states once it is
attained; furthermore, as a sta~ of some
distinguishabl7 facul qr C?fthe ~--the language
faculty--with 1ts speci.f.ic propert.Les, structure, and
organization, one "module" of the mind."
Cllamsky1986: 12-13
It is appropriate that he should describe the mind in tenn.s
of modules for that is the way he describes linguistics.
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Each different aspect of linguistics can be viewed as a
module itself. At the core of these modules is grammar, the
object of study of linguistics proper. Again this is very
similar to the approach which Saussure took in vie.ving his
la langue as the core of linguistic study am relating all
other aspects to it. In this respect. , the
synchronic/diachronic and internal/external distinctions
seem to accomplish the same objective as the modular
approach of generative linguistics.
Chomsky's dual meanings
In presenting the views of Chomskymanydistinctions
have been made. Among those are ones like his dual meaning
for the term "qrammar , II '!here appear to be several other
such dualities in Chomsky'stheory, even though manyare
well obscured by his technical use of the tenus. By taking
a critical look at the way Chomskyuses tenus such as
"qrammar" as well as IIknowledge,II IIrule , II and liability, II
this section shall attempt to expose someof those hidden
dualities.
One objection that has been raised against Chomskyis
that in theorizing about grammar, he confuses (albeit
intentionally) statements which are only attributable to his
theory (UG), with claims about the structure of language in
the mirrljbrain. 'This maybe seen as a criticism of his dual
meanings for the tenn IIgrammar. IIHowever, in his most recent
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text, Knowledgeof language (1986), he argues that the
interpretation of generative granunar as a theory is not
appropriate. Instead, he suggests that it be thought of in
comparison to other sciences. "It is not a theory any lOOre
than chemistry is a theory. Generative granunar is a topic,
which one mayor maynot choose to study." (Chomsky1986:
4) Presumably what he means here is that generative granunar
is si111plya way of looking at the world, urrlerstanding
certain events in a certain way. He says that one COUld
adopt a view that what chemistry explains is really done "by
angels with mirrors. II A similar view of the nature of
linguistic explanation could be adopted, but, aCCOrdingto
Chomskythis would be a difficult view to uphold.
Recognizing the confusion surrounding his use of "granunarll,
he responds by saying that all such a granunar as his UG
would be, is a description of linguistic events. In an
earlier work, he specifically states that it is "not a model
for speaker or hearer." (Cllomsky1965: 9) '!he question of
howa speaker might actually fonnulate utterances is a
question of perfonnance. '!here fore , Presumably, it would be
a task for psychology proper, not linguistics. Linguistics
tries to characterize the knowledge that speakers rely on in
order to perform.
In addition to his split conception of qrammar-, Olomsky
also seems to profess a dual conception of knowledge. For
Chomsky,one does not have to know or be aware that one
possesses this innate knowledge of language. '!hough this
mayappear contradictory (howcan one not know what one
knows?) Olomskyattempts to clarify the issue by introducing
the tenn "cognize." (Chomsky1980: 69) In short, what is
Jmown is cognized, but not all cognized material is known.
Cognized material is presumably in the mirrl or brain, but we
mayor maynot be explicitly aware of it being there. "Thus
cognizing is tacit or implicit knowledge, a concept that
seems to me unobjectionable." (Olomsky1980: 70) Granted,
for Olomsky, this would not seem difficult to accept given
his scientific approach. If there is such an organ as a
linguistic cognitive stnlcture, then there are bound to be
facts about it that we don't know. '!his is true just as we
don't know all the facts about the heart or brain. '!his
idea does still raise problem however, specifically because
one does not nonnally speak of "cognizing" something.
One reason that this seems inconsistent is that Olomsky
relies on the intuitions of native speakers for his data on
their kncMledgeof language. What seems strange is to deny
them the awareness of this knowledge. If one keeps in mirrl
the distinction between cognition am knowledge just
discussed, then one realizes that Chomsky's theory is not
one of linguistic knowledgeat all. It is instead a theory
of linguistic cognition. '!his seems to suggest that
Chomsky's original quest for a characterization of
linguistic knowledgehas altered slightly am resulted in a
separate theory. Instead of spea.kirg of someoneas knowing
a language one should talk of them cognizing a language.
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Instead of sayirg "John knows English," if we wish to be
generative grannnarians, we should say "John has a cognition
of English." Arrl yet, even O1omskydoes not usually speak
of his quest as a search for cognition, but rather of
knc:M'ledge.
"Linguistic theory is COncerned primarily with an
ideal speaker-listener, ... , whoknows its language
perfectly and is unaffected by such grammatically
irrelevant conditions of natory limitations,
distractions, shifts of attention and interest and
errors. · ·in applying his knc:M'ledgeof the l~ge in
actual perfonncmce."
O1omsky1965: 4
Pertlaps we can look more closely at what O1om.sky
means by "applying his knowledge" by understandirg his use
of the tenn "ability." In spite of the fact that he often
refers to competence as an ability, nevertheless he treats
the use of language as the result of a mental state, not an
ability. '!his is explained in his work, Reflections on
language (1975). Hemodels the leamirg theory for language
acquisition by a humanon a psychological Learrrinq theory.
He says that for rats learning to run a maze:
"'!he input to UI'(R,M)[where R stands for rats, M
stands for maze running, and Dr is the leamirg theory]
is whatever preliminary analysis of data is used by
rats to accomplish this fea~ [maze running], and the
output is the relevant coqnrtdve structure, however it
should be properly characterized as a component of the
state achieved by the rat whoknowshow to run a maze."
Chomsky1975: 14
Note however, that identifying an ability with a certain
mental state changes the discussion. No longer is the
discussion about howabilities explain performanoa, but
rather we are talking about mental states. '!he philosopher
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Wittgenstein has argued however that abilities are not
mental states. In fact, his beetle-in-the-box analogy shOlNS
that language use can be explained without reference to what
goes on in the mind at all.
""SUppose everyone had a box with 5Cm:thing in it:
we call ita "beetle." No one can look into anyone
else's box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is
by Lookiriq at his beetle.-Here it WOUldbe quite
possible for everyone to have 5Cm:thing different in
his box. One might even imagine the thing constantly
changing. -But suppose the word "beetle" had a use in
these people's language--if so it WOUldnot be used as
the nameof a thing. '!he thing in the box has no place
in the language-game at all: not even as a something
for the box might even be errpty." ,
Wittgenstein 1953: 293
In order to understand howthis relates to Chomsky's
position, compare the "beetle" to Chomsky'sproposed mental
states. If the use of a word or sentence is the result of a
certain mental state, then it is quite possible for every
individual to have a different mental state occur in their
mind and still use the sameword in the same way. It is
even conceivable, as Wittgenstein suggests, that this mental
state could be constantly changing, say from one use of the
word to another, arrl still be using the word correct Iy, in
the same way that is, because the mental state has nothing
to do with the linguistic use of the word. Take for example
the word "pain". Each of us have our own pain sensations.
Wecan never feel another's pain sensation, and yet we make
use of the word "pain" quite regularly with no difficulties
in understanding. Wecould even be correct in our use of
the word to apply to someonewhohad no pain sensation at
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that m::m:mtat all, say an actor for example. 'Ihus it WOUld
seem that the mental state one mayor may not be in, or even
whether that mental state exists in anyone, has no bearing
on one's use of terms purportedly referring to that mental
state.
~tly then it seems as if Olansky has tume:1 the
discussion on to a side-track by bringing in mental states.
In contrast to Olomsky's view, Baker am Hacker point out in
Language« Sense and Nonsense (1984), one of their
expositions of wittgensteinian ideas, that linguistic
competence "can mean no more than the ability to speak am
understarrl a language and/or perhaps to the ability to learn
a new one." (Baker and Hacker 1984: 282) In other WOrds,
what they are rejecting about Olomsky's theory is the way in
which he "remodels" the use of the term "ability". For, put
simply, an ability is being able to do something. If one
can continue an action in the samemanner as it was begun
then one is said to have the ability to perform that action.
SUchan attribution has nothing to do with the state of the
actor, mind or brain. Perhaps this distinction will become
clearer after discussing the dual interpretation of the term
"rule."
The tenn "rule" has been often used through out this
paper. Indeed, it enj oys frequent use in everyday language
as well. Wespeak of following rules, breaking rules, doing
things in accord with the rules. But all of these uses can
be confusing. '!he meaning of "rule" is very ambiguous for it
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has at least two senses, a prescriptive one am a
descriptive one. Cllamskyhas already been seen as
characterizing rules as descriptive. In that sense a rule
is s.impl.y a generalization. Wespeak of things happening as
a rule. Baker am Hacker on the other harrl adopt a
prescriptive notion of rules. For them a rule tells the way
a lirguistic act should happen. It is nonnative in
function. Urrler this conception
" ... rules detennine (logically) what is to count
as correct applications of them, i.e. we use rules
(though not 'hidden' ones) together with a method of
projection to fix what is to be called 'following a
rule'. "
Baker am Hacker 1984: 283
Thus whenwe utter a granmnnatical sentence we are exercising
our lirguistic ability. 'Ihen we tum to the rule as a
justification or to show that the utterance is correct. It
is not the rule which makes the choice for us or which
somehowgives us the sentence. Rules can be seen as
limitations on perfonnance. One is free to movethe pieces
on a chessboard hcwever one wishes, but only moves allowed
by the rules of chess are called "playing the gameof
chess." Similarly, in language, rules impose the bounds of
sense. It is not the case that rules comeabout from or are
descriptions of our mental states. Nor do they have a hand
in the way our sentences are created. Instead, it is the
language-user whoappeals to rules to explain, teach,
correct, or judge the sentences we choose to utter.
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'!he view that the sentences we utter are derived from
grammatical :rules is an example of what Anthony Kennycalls
the HamonculusFallacy. (Kenny1984: 125-136) It is a
typical mistake madeby thosa whoview language on a
mec:h.a.nisticmodel of the mind. (For a history ani criticism
of this view see Harris 1987b.) Kenny argues that
postulatirg a mental mechanismmakes the mistake of
explainirg howhumansuse language by POStulating the
existence of something within us which actually operates the
language. O1omsky's description of grarranar as a "device"
which "generates" sentences indicates he adopts this view.
Kennyconterrls that it is a faulty argument whenhuman
actions are predicated on non-htnnanthings or things that
are only part of what a human is (i. e. - the brain/ntirxi) .
'!his can be seen as another way of rejecting the same point
which Baker am Hacker rejected in interpreting competence
as meaning no more than an ability. Cllomskyargues that
linguistic ability consists in a cognitive or mental
structure. Kenny suggests that it is not mental structures
that have linguistic ability but htnnansand that ability is
not a something which the human possesses (like a watch or a
heart) . It is the whole being that uses language. (Kenny
1984: 138)
'!his simple confusion leads to difficulties which
demandexplanation. It is these difficulties which
Chomsky's theory has attempted to explain, but his chosen
approach has altered the intent of the investigation. His
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approach has led him to adopt a merrtal.rrechanismwhich
demarrls conceptions of linguistic rules, graInmar am
competency furrlamentally different fran those we ordinarily
employ. 'Iherefore, can his solutions really be said to
really solve the problems of linguistics?
Stnlcturalisrn and Generati visrn
'Ibis thesis has examined the efforts of two linguists
to illuminate the nature of language am linguistic
knowledge. Along the way the theories of Saussure am
Chomskyhave been shown to have manysimilarities boch in
theoretical stnlctures, the langue/parole am
competence/perfonnance distinction, as well as in conceptual
assumptions, their shared mentalist am scientific
approaches. 'Ihese similarities have arisen despite the fact
that the historical traditions from which the theories arose
are quite different. Further, even though the two theories
share specific differences concemirq the precise
conceptualization of language, the fact that they are both a
part of a larger philosophical tradition is what has
influenced them to be so nruchalike. It is the assumptions
of this larger tradition that this paper has called into
question.
Perhaps the most basic of these shared assumptions is
that of mentalism. Most of the problems am difficulties
that arise for both Saussure am Olomskyare a result of
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their positing language as a manifestation of something
within the mirrl or brain. '!he dilemmawhich plagues
Saussure over the characterization of la langue as social or
irrlividual, as well as Cllomsky'sconfused notion of graInmar
as a "mental organ", are both connected to this shared
mentalism. As Saussure pointed out, language does appear to
be dualistic in nature. Neither he nor ChanskyWOUldwant
to enph.asize one pole of this dualism over the other. As
Saussure sees it, to view la langue as something irrlividual
is to delegate the study of linguistics to the field of
psychology. On the other hand, to approach language as
merely an aspect of social interaction is to enter the field
of anthropol.oqy. As we have seen, in order to uphold his
goal of establishing linguistics as a scientific discipline
Saussure is forced to posit la langue as an entity which has
aspects of both interpretations but which is the pc>ssession
of neither. Similarly, Cllomskyatte.npts to conflate another
distinction, one between a psychological explanation am a
purel y biological account of language. 'This can be seen as
an atte.npt to avoid the same dilemmaas well. AIthough
reacting against behaviorist psychology, Chomskyis
reluctant to explain language as totally due to a person's
mental faculties. On the other hand, at times, he appears
to shy away from an account; of language as the social
manifestation of a biological organ. Chomsky's reticence is
confusing for such an explanation would be the ultimate
application of his theory. Under this view, a conplete am
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accurate description of the UGwould be an account of the
mechanics of the language faculty. Chomskyis more
agreeable to a psychological view of language than is
Saussure, and yet he is forced to posit graImnar as a
specific l1lirrl/brain entity so that linguistics may remain
separate from other psychological fields and yet not be
reduced to biology either. Giving linguistics its own
"object of study", this language IOOChanism,at the same time
gives it autonomy from other psychological fields and in
that way, keeps it fram the biologist as well.
What the theories of Saussure and Chomskydo is attenpt
to define an object for linguistics to study. In each case,
the objects so defined are viewed as mental entities. 'Ihe
arqument.s presented above against "telementation" and
against the view of language as a "state of mind" reveal the
difficulties with this approach. As we have seen though,
the creation of these mental entities is a result of their
having chosen to approach the study of language as an
autonomous science.
'Thebasic requirement of any science is that it has a
clearly defined object of study. Given their mentalist
preoccupations however, both Saussure and O1omskyare hard
pressed to find one. Acknowledgingthe dual nature of
linguistic phenomena, neither linguist wishes to choose one
aspect over another, and so the linguistic object is
characterized as having both. '!he theories however, focus
only on the mental, the unobservable side. Olaracterizing
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their objects as such, they therefore encounter not only the
difficul ties of describing am establishing the existence of
such an object, but also the dilemna of howsuch an object
is to be accessed for use by an imividual speaker.
Additionally, there is the problem of howthe object is to
be studied, given that it is not directly obsexvable. '1hese
are the criticisms that have been specifically addressed to
Saussure's theory. However,while Saussure never
acknOVJledgedthese criticisms as problems, it must be said
that at least Chomskydoes recognize arrl attempt to deal
with them.
Having defined their objects, each theory then develops
a picture of linguistics which accords with fundamental
"objects". Saussure "relates all other manifestations of
language" to linguistic structure. Likewise, Chomsky builds
his theory of linguistics on the fourrlations of his concept
of a Irental organ. 'lhese divisions of linguistic facts
however, only fall into their respective positions if the
basic object is defined first. Once the object is defined
as SOIrethinginternal, all the manifestations of this object
can be seen as external. '!his tidy division works well for
def irrinq linguistics as the study of this Irrcernaj, Object.
&It, not only do both Saussure and Chomsky define their
science arourrl this object internal to the diSCipline, but
the object. is also characterized in another sense as
internal, i. e. -as internal to the humanmind, '!his however,
is where the mentalism of the theories begins to cause
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methodological problems. Most scientific theories attempt
to describe events external to the humanmirxi: that is, the
scientist adopts the role of the observer. 'Ibis is Alice's
position behirxi her tree. Whenthe scientist begins to
study sarething internal to the mind, he becanes both an
observer am observed. In most; cases, as with the linguist
too, the scientist can turn to other humansbesides himself
for obser.vation, but when reporting linguistic obser.vations
he himself must use Lanquaqe, Not only is he using language
at this point but those with whomhe is communicating also
use Lanquaqe to interpret his firxiings. At this point it is
very easy to confuse what is internal with what is external..
'!his is again, precisely the same difficulties which
Saussure faces in detennining whether his data belongs to la
langue or to la parole. On the one hand he says that la
langue is sarrething that is internal to the intividual, in
that each of us has access to it, ani yet, on the other
hand, he states that it is only perfect as sanething
external, i. e. -as a social obj ect. Again, however, Chomsky
acknowledges this distinction am attempts to deal with it.
His answer however, is based upon his mentalism.
In his most recent work (Cllomsky1986), he discusses
the fact that his view of Lanquaqe is a shift from thinking
in terns of Ianquaqe as external to one that is internal.
As he describes it, it is a move "from behavior and its
products to the system of Jrnowledgethat enters into
behavior .... " (Chomsky1986: 28) As previously discussed,
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there have been criticisms of Olcmsky's concept of
knowledge. Also, this seems to be nothing IOOre than trying
to explain howpeople use language by saying that its
sarething in the mirrljbrain. 'Ihe argtlIlalt provided by Kenny
rej ects this as an appropriate lOCJVe. The suggestion that
one not look within the brain for an object of study in the
end may lead one to question the search for an object at
all.
Conclusion
Saussure seems rightly to acknowledge the OPinion that
"the object of linguistics is not given in advance," am
that "it is the viewpoint adopted which creates the obj ect"
(Saussure 1916: 9). Having examined these two theories of
the nature of language, perhaps we ourselves should take
heed of this statement. As the King of Hearts told Alice
"If there's no meaning in it, then that saves a world of
trouble, you know, as we needn't try to find any." Perhaps
if there is no predefined object of study for linguistics we
need not search for one. If the object only arises once the
methcx:lfor its examination is determined then to some extent
at least, one already k:rla¥s what one will find when one
selects a methodology. Howcan the linguist hope to find
out what language is really like if his methods already
detennine what he is going to find?
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Perhaps if we are to use the notion of abject of study
in a strict scientific sense, linguistics has no abject.
But of course the linguist would not be hawy with this
answer, for he knows that he studies a something. What is
that somet:hirg? In the broadest sense of the tenn it COUld
be said that he simply studies "lanJUage." But then this
leads us right back to the beginning with the question,
''Well, what is language?" Ani furthenoore, as the analysis
of the theories of (hansky arrl Saussure show, howone
answers this question will direct the way one studies the
so-called object: language. As we have seen, this is a very
difficult task if one adopts a scientific arrl a lOOl1talist
view together. since we have examined arguments against
both of these views separately, am l10W question them
together, let us briefly examine howa linguistic theory not
based on either view might be structured.
To begin, let us examine one other criticism of
theories such as Saussure's and Chomsky's. Harris argues
that the approaches of both these linguists are too abstract
in that they deal with language only known by an "ideal
speaker-hearer" in a "homogenousspeech corranunity ." (Harris
1981: 32) This movehe sees as problematic in that it
ignores many contextual influences that seemingly ought to
be factors considered in an account of the linguistic event.
For Saussure and Olomskythese influences are ruled out of
consideration as parts of parole or perfonnance. However,
as Harris asserts, the ordinary use of the tenns "speaker"
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am "hearer" seem to imply muchlOOrethan one WOUldbe lead
to believe from their technical use by a linguist. He
writes:
"For the layman, speaking is usually u:rnerstood to
involv~ a whole gamut of skills am acti vi ties, varying
accordinq to the demarrlsof the ocx::asion. It is
certainly not scmethinq which is confined to vibrations
of the vocal cords am configurations of the vocal
tract, but involves such features as appropriate facial
expression, gaze, body POSture am gesture. It also
involves choice am relevance of what is said. 'He
spoke convincingly' is not usually a camnent on
someone's articulation. Hearing likewise is taken to
involve much more than the mere aural reception of
sourrl waves."
Harris 1981: 33
Note here, however, that this is not merely another
confusion over definitions of tenns. By abstracting to an
ideal situation, thanks to the adoption of a scientific
viewpoint, Saussure am Cllomskycan be seen as ceasing to
talk about language in the way that nnst of us ordinarily
do. By taking the scientific object 'language' out of its
situational contexts am idealizing it (recreating it as an
abstract or biological object of science), one passes by the
question what language itself really is am instead attempts
to answer another question: what is linguistic knowledge?
Answers to this question are conceived as knowledgeof the
postulated scientific object, language. No longer is the
linguist describing aspects of a linguistic event; he's not
concerned with what the speaker and hearer do. Rather, hers
trying to analyze the characteristics of someobject,
language, knowledgeof which is said to be required for the
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speaker am hearer to do what they do. 'Ihere thus appears
to be a confusion over what "language" means. In their
search for a scientific object, saussure am Chomskyassume
that "language" means the thing tbat linguistics studies,
and forget about its ordinary meaning: what goes on between
a speaker and a hearer and which they themselves often refer
to with the tenn 'language'. It should be the point of the
games analogy to illustrate the fact tbat the position of a
speaker/hearer is that of a game player, not tbat the
players have knowledge of somemysterious thing called "a
game." language is not a mysterious entity. 'Ib view it as
such is to suggest that ordinary speakers am hearers do not
knowwhat they meanwhen they use the term "language."
language is COlIllOOnlyknown by us all in the same way that we
knowgames.
Both saussure and Chomskymake reference to the gaIOOs
analogy, yet neither realize its full implications. If the
rules of a language are viewed as similar to those of a
game, then the nature of a rule is quite different from the
way that Chomskyconceptualizes it. Knowledgeof generatiVe
linguistic rules is different from knowledge of the rules of
a game, am further, what it means to say that we have such
knowledge is not the same as what O1omskymeans when he
speaks of knowledge of language. 'lb say that one knows the
rules of chess ordinarily means tbat one knows how to play
the game, how to explain the game, how to teach the game,
arrl/or how to referee a game, etc. '!hus, in saying that one
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knows chess, one simply means that one can play the ~ of
chess. No object (of krlowledge) is p~ by the
statement that "He knows chess." Similarly, in language, to
krloN the rules of a given l..mguage is to knowhow to use
the words of that language. If one knows the language, one
can play its game: that is one can speak the language
correctly, one can listen to a speaker of the language, one
can urrlerstarrl the language, and all the various other
linguistic activities that involve doing things with the
language. '!hus, to say one knows a language is not the same
as to say that one's mind or brain is in a particular state
or that one partakes in a commonshared consciousness of a
abstract social object. But it is these sorts of
attributions that O1amskyand Saussure, in order to make the
study of language into an aut011OlOOUSacademic diSCipline,
take to give rooaning to claims of linguistic knowledge. But
nothing suddenly appears in our brains once we have learned
chess and can be said to knowit; and it would certainly be
queer to say that we all knowchess innately. 'Ib say so, we
would also have to say that we have innate knowledge of all
other games, even those not yet invented!
So finally, what does this conception of the nature of
language say about the way that it should be studied? What
would one study if one studied games? Clearly one COUldnot
abstract out of the playing context to detennine whyplayers
make the IOOVesthat they do. Instead, the context is vital.
'!he reason a player makes a particular IOOVeis because of
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the previous m:JVesmade in the game. A gaming session is
far fran ideal also. In fact, many times, it is the
mistakes am errors of players which bring interest to the
game. Howthe other players react, howthe player corrects
himself, what other niles, or even other players are brought
into the game as. a result of this infraction are all a part
of what is important in a game. So too, for the linguist,
are the various aspects of a linguistic situation important.
If a speaker uses a word incorrectly then the results of
this use are only someof the considerations that linguists
should study. For instance, if a speaker uses the tenn
"knowledge" incorrectly, the linguist must examine previous
uses of the tenn to see if this m:JVeis a valid one. Howa
hearer reacts will give insight into his or her own use of
the term. But not only do situational factor influence
one's use of language, a speaker's past linguistic
experiences with the hearer, the fonnality am other
characteristics of the situation also influence a speaker's
use of language. '!he linguist, it appears, must take the
whole context of the situation into account in his or her
study of the language used during that linguistic event.
Just as a gaIOOplayer cannot makea movewithout knowing the
whole context of the game, a speaker cannot makea move in
language without knowingthe language. Similarly, the
linguist cannot study a single dimension of language without
taking all of language into consideration.
63
But what of the intellectual respect of the sciences to
which Chanskyam Saussure aspired? As mentioned at the
start of this paper, rules have great significance in our
society. In one fonn or another games, especially athletic
ones, have a place in al.rrost every humanlife. 'Iheir
inportance is so great that billions of dollars are spent on
the playirg of sirgle sessions of particular games, ani the
players of such games are held in very high esteem. Games
have <X.I'OO to such prc.minence in our society that the playirg
of them has almost; become a science. 'Ihe analysis of
statistics of play, the development of stategies, ani the
technology that has developed for the execution of SOIOO
games have all became such highly developed ani exactirg
practices that they are strong conterrlers for the ranks of
the sciences . Similarly, the linguistic aficionado COUld
also take an academic position of high esteem with the
development of his theory of language. 'Ihe study of
language can be just as precise in its methods as any
science and yet not forget the other side of gameplaying.
'!he execution of the movesof a game can be seen as a
creative art fonn, and likewise, it is perhaps no
coincidence that one refers to the art of speaking. Under
this conception, theories of linguistics would take into
consideration such context-deperrlent phenomenaas style,
vocal intonation, irrlividual creat.Ivrty, and the like. What
this means is that no longer is linguistics an autononnus
academic discipline, a science like chemistry, but rather an
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interdisciplinary study of a variety of different but
related activities am events. '!here are many different
things called "games", yet there is no one aspect whidJ. they
all share. Irrleed, same games are quite different fran one
another, so muchso that a canparison of two might lead one
to say that they both couldn't be games. Linguistics can be
thought of in a similar way. '!he different aspects of
larguage studied by linguists are as different as one game
is fram another, am yet all are related, for they are all
parts of larguage. However, one must be careful not to draw
the analogy too far. Although larguage is like a game, it
is itself not a gaIOO. One must remember that this is only
an analogy, a context fram which to learn. By using the
games analogy, we can came to recognize this context am
gain insight fram this. Like the stories of Carroll, taking
things out of context can lead one into nonsense. It has
been suggested that the the idealization of language leads
one to similar conclusions. One whowishes to study
larguage seems to be left in a dangerous position. On the
one hand he does not want to "utter nonsense", am yet, he
doesn't want to hear it either.
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